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for mechanisms through which foreign aid is channeled. In uniting the two streams we argue that investment and fiscal behavior mechanisms are essential for a better understanding of the nexuses between aid and corruption. On the one hand, consistent with Easterly (2005) , 'Big-Push' (Harrod-Domar and Solow growth) models which constitute the main theoretical underpinnings of foreign aid are premised on the need for large aid-financed increases in investment in order to bridge 'poverty and institutional gaps'. On the other hand, it is common sense to acknowledge that aid affects fiscal behavior in terms of government expenditure and tax effort. Hence, the goal of this paper is to assess how development assistance affects corruption through investment and fiscal behavior mechanisms in 53 African countries. The richness of the dataset permits us to disaggregate the countries into fundamental characteristics of corruption (legal origins, petroleum exporting quality, political instability/conflicts, regional proximity, openness to sea, income-levels and religious domination), which add subtlety to the analysis.
Putting aside the direct contribution of this paper to the current debate, it indirectly has other policy relevant contributions to the literature. Firstly, a great bulk of the literature is based on data collected between 1960 and 2000. By using recent data (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) , we provide an updated account of the nexuses under investigation. Secondly, the global economic downturn has sparked concerns about donor's continued willingness to give and commitment to foreign aid (Ahmed et al., 2011) . Hence, assessing the incidence of aid on corruption in a comparative setting could throw more light on this aspect of the debate 6 . Thirdly, a corollary of the second contribution is the shifting of policy space to aid alternatives from East Asia. Learning from the 6 Koechlin (2007) has recently reframed the debate by examining three ambitious books (Sachs's The End of Poverty, Bhagwati's In Defense of Globalization, and Easterly's The Elusive Quest for Growth), and has concluded that, the insights and drawbacks of these three books remind us that the status quo is not working and that a rich understanding of globalization and development requires a serious consideration of alternative visions of each. Some new ways of theorizing development in light of the globalized systems of food production have included the USA led 'genetically modified food aid' to the Southern African region, that is widely criticized by the European Union (Herrick, 2008). 5 East Asian success stories has been hampered by an asymmetric bargaining power of African governments, vis-à-vis Western development partners 7 . Fourthly, there have been substantial changes in objectives announced by the donor community which have evolved from intensive industrialization programs advocated in the 1950s to more recent poverty-reduction and institutions-building objectives such the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Accordingly, with the year 2015 drawing near this study also provides policy options to donor and multilateral agencies on their assistance objective of building strong institutions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines existing literature before presenting the scope and positioning of the paper in light of the ongoing debate. Data and methodologies issues are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 covers the empirical analysis. We conclude with Section 5.
Foreign aid and development 2.1 Conflicts in the literature
A substantial bulk of the literature has focused on the macroeconomic consequences of aid, but mixed results have been reported and those that have established significant positive effects face heavy methodological criticisms. The absence of analytical framework, heavy reliance on empirical evidence (which is often ambiguous at best) and inconclusive results with recently refined methodologies (Masud & Yontcheva, 2005) , have left the subject matter widely open to debate. For organizational purposes, the highlighted conflicts on the effectiveness of aid on development is presented in two main strands summarized in Table 1 below: one advocating 6 the negative consequences of aid and the other acknowledging the positive rewards of development assistance.
The first strand entails authors presenting the case for the insignificant impact of aid on investment, savings, growth and institutions. Aid has been established to breed unproductive public consumption (Mosley et al., 1992) without increasing investment. This latter position has been supported by Boone (1996) and Reichel (1995) . Ghura (1995) has pointed to the negative effect of aid on domestic savings whereas Pedersen (1996) has asserted that, foreign aid distorts development and leads to aid dependency. Very recent African aid-development literature has established that aid fuels corruption (Asongu, 2012a) , a negative nexus that has been extended to other government quality dynamics of political stability, government effectiveness, rule of law, voice & accountability and regulation quality (Asongu, 2012b) irrespective of initial levels in institutional quality (Asongu, 2013a) .
Table 1: Summary of conflicts in the literature

Researchers
Main findings
First-strand: Aid does not lead to growth (development) Mosley et al. (1992) Aid improves unproductive public consumption and fails to promote growth. Reichel (1995) Aid fails to promote savings because of the substitution effect. Ghura (1995) Aid negatively affects savings. Boone (1996) Aid is insignificant in improving economic development for two reasons: poverty is not the effect of capital shortage and it is not optimal for politicians to adjust distortionary policies when they receive aid flows. Pedersen (1996) Aid distorts development and leads to aid dependency.
Asongu (2012a)
Aid fuels corruption and mitigates the control of corruption.
Asongu (2012b)
Aid is perilous to government quality dynamics.
Asongu (2013a)
Aid is perilous to institutional quality irrespective of initial levels of institutional development.
Second-strand: Aid improves growth (development) Ghura (1995) Aid positively affects savings for good adjusters. Burnside & Dollar (2000) Aid can be effective when economic management and policies are good. Guillaumont & Chauvet (2001) Aid effectiveness is contingent on environmental factors (hazards and shocks). Collier & Dehn (2001) Aid effectiveness depends on negative supply shocks. Targeting aid contingent 7 on negative supply shocks is better than targeting based on good policies. Collier & Dollar (2001) The positive effect of aid on poverty depends on its impact on per-capita income growth and the impact of per-capita income growth on poverty mitigation.
Feeny (2003) The sectoral allocation of foreign aid to Papua New Guinea has been broadly in accordance with a strategy to effectively reduce poverty and increase human wellbeing. Gomanee et al. (2003) Aid has both a direct effect on welfare and indirect effect through public spending on social services.
Clement et al. (2004)
Aid has a short-term positive effect on growth. Ishfaq (2004) Aid, in a limited way though, has helped in reducing the extent of poverty in Pakistan. Mosley et al. (2004) Aid has an indirect impact on poverty and the well-being of recipient countries. Addison et al. (2005) Aid increases pro-poor public expenditure and has a positive effect on growth. Aid broadly works to mitigate poverty, and poverty would be higher in the absence of aid. Fielding et al. (2006) There is a straight forward positive effect of aid on development outcomes. Minou & Reddy (2010) Aid positively affects growth in the long-term.
Okada & Samreth (2012) Aid reduces corruption. Resnick (2012) Aid has promoted democratic transitions in African countries in the 1990s.
Source (Authors)
In the second strand, we find studies supporting the positive effects of aid on development. Among them, we shall highlight that of Burnside & Dollar (2000) which concludes that aid can be effective when policies in place are good. The Burnside & Dollar (2000) work has received abundant comments from researchers (Guillaumont & Chauvet, 2001; Colier & Dehn, 2001; Easterly et al., 2003) , whose findings have been challenged as being "extremely data dependent" (Clemens et al., 2004) . Whereas Clemens et al. (2004) have shown that aid is beneficial in the short-run; Minou & Reddy (2010) have recently established that the beneficial effects could also be in the long-run. Gomanee et al. (2003) have concluded that aid has both a direct impact on welfare and an indirect effect via public spending and social services.
The indirect position has been substantiated by Mosley et al. (2004) on poverty and wellbeing in recipient countries. While the effectiveness of aid is more straight forward for some (Ishfaq, 8 2004; Addison et al., 2005; Fielding et al., 2006) 8 and aid may promote democratic institutions (Resnick, 2012) , the Okada & Samreth (2012) findings on 'the effect of foreign aid on corruption' have recently been object of intense debate from an African perspective (Asongu, 2012a (Asongu, , 2013a .
Scope and positioning
Scope: a current debate
As highlighted in the introduction, the Okada & Samreth (2012) Addison et al. (2005) have concluded that aid solidifies pro-poor public expenditure and has a positive effect on growth as it broadly works towards poverty mitigation. Their stance that poverty will be higher in the absence of aid has been confirmed by Ishfaq (2004) . Among the examined proponents of a positive aid-development nexus, Fielding et al. (2006) have been the most optimistic in their conclusion on a straight forward positive impact of aid on development outcomes. corruption to eight institutional quality dynamics (rule of law, regulation quality, government effectiveness, democracy, corruption, voice & accountability, control of corruption and political stability). Core to this extension is a hypothetical contingency of the 'institutional downside of foreign aid' on existing institutional quality such that, the institutional peril of development assistance maybe questionable when greater domestic institutional development has taken place.
Based on this hypothesis of institutional thresholds for foreign aid effectiveness, the perilous character of development assistance to institutional quality is broadly confirmed in 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010 (Asongu, 2013a, p. 1) .
In response, some scholars have informally pointed-out the lack of fiscal policy and investment channels in the debate. The debate in its present state has not deviated from the Accordingly, consistent with Knack & Keefer (1995) who have concluded that more indicators are needed to properly account for the quality of institutions (p. 223), this paper further extends the debate by providing an indirect dimension to the nexus: transmission mechanisms of foreign aid to corruption.
Positioning: fiscal behavior and investment mechanisms
We devote space to substantiating the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of the fiscal behavior and investment mechanisms in the aid-corruption nexus. As emphasized in the theoretical highlights above, the 'Big-Push' model on which foreign aid is based suggests that Africa is poor because it is stuck in poverty and institutional traps (Easterly, 2005) . To emerge from the traps, it needs a large aid-financed increase in investment: a 'Big Push'. Both the Harrod-Domar and the Solow growth models have been used to discuss these mechanisms. The underlying assumption here is the notion that the 'Big Push' is destined to bridge the savinginvestment gap poor countries face (Rostow, 1960; Chenery & Strout, 1966; Easterly, 2005) .
From an empirical standpoint, in assessing the impact of foreign aid, a great chunk of studies have focused on the effect of aid-flows on GDP growth and other macroeconomic variables (investment or public consumption). Gomanee et al. (2003) have concluded that aid has both a direct effect on welfare and an indirect impact through public spending and social services. The indirect standpoint has been confirmed by Mosley et al. (2004) on poverty and wellbeing in recipient countries. Aid has also been established to breed unproductive public consumption (Mosley et al., 1992) without increasing investment. This latter point has been supported by Boone (1996) and Reichel (1995) . Addison et al. (2005) have found that aid strengthens pro-poor public expenditure. Donors are concerned about how their aid is used especially the manner in which it affects the fiscal behavior of recipient countries because aid and government fiscal behavior are linked through government spending and tax efforts (Morrissey, 2012) .
Two aid mechanisms clearly standout from the theoretical and empirical underpinnings above: fiscal behavior and investment channels. Hence, the goal of this paper is to assess how development assistance affects corruption through investment and fiscal behavior mechanisms.
Data and Methodology
Data
We assess a sample of 53 African with data from the African Development Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank (WB) for the period 1996-2010. Limitations to African countries and periodicity have a twofold justification: on the one hand, they are consistent with the underpinnings of the debate and the other hand; indicators on corruption are not available before 11 1996 9 . The dependent variables are the corruption perception and corruption-control indexes (Asongu, 2012a) .
Determination of fundamental characteristics
We now devote space to discussing the determination of fundamental characteristics which are critical for the relevance of the empirics. The simple intuition motivating this categorization is the interest of more focused policy options based on fundamental characteristics of corruption. Accordingly, government quality dynamics (transparency, regulation quality…etc) and macroeconomic characteristics have the limitation of being time-dynamic. Therefore, the same non-dummy threshold may not be consistent over time, especially on a horizon of 15 years. This is especially the case when short-run (business cycle) disturbances loom substantially large.
To categorize the countries, we are consistent with recent African corruption-oriented literature on capital flight (Weeks, 2012; Asongu, 2013b) and software piracy (Asongu, 2012c) . Hence, political instability or conflicts, petroleum exports, legal origins, income levels, regional proximity, religious domination and openness to sea (landlocked nature) are fundamental to corruption.
Firstly, the 'conflict affected' characteristic presents analytical and practical issues.
Difficulties arise in assigning countries to this category in an exclusive and non-arbitrary manner. Accordingly, few countries in Africa are completely conflict-free. Hence, distinctions must be made on the basis of degree and significance of conflict-span relative to data-span.
Given the 53 countries over the period 1996-2010 two strands emerge: civil wars and conflicts/political strife. For the first strand on civil wars, few would object to the inclusion of Angola (1975 Angola ( -2002 , Burundi (1993 Burundi ( -2005 Liberia (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) , Sierra Leone (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) , Somalia and Sudan. In the second strand, despite the absence of some formal characteristics of civil war, we also include Nigeria and Zimbabwe due to the severity of their internal strife.
Secondly, concerning petroleum countries, a critical categorical objection is that some petroleum countries also clearly qualify as conflict-affected (e.g Angola and Sudan). As opposed to Weeks (2012) we impose no constraints of categorical priority. Hence, a country may fall in many categories if it has the relevant categorical characteristics. Accordingly for this class, arbitrariness also arises if a country qualifies for only a part of the time period, either because of recent discovery or substantially declined in production. Another objection could by that; some producers (e.g Botswana) have macroeconomic characteristics similar to petroleum exporting countries. We take a minimalistic approach by adhering strictly to the petroleum category and including only countries whose exports have been oil-dominated for over a decade within the period 1996-2010: Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya, Nigeria and Sudan.
Thirdly, the premise of legal origin is based on: the emphasis legal origins place on private property rights vis-à-vis those of the state (La Porta et al., 1998) ; the empirical evidence on the link between legal origins and corruption (La Porta et al., 1999) and; recent African comparative institutional literature on the weight of legal origins on government quality (Asongu, 2013c) and property rights (Asongu, 2012c) . Accordingly, the hypothesis that English common-law countries place more emphasis on private property rights, while French civil-law focuses more on state power has been confirmed by recent African literature. Hence, the underlying logic for this segmentation is that the institutional web of informal norms, formal rules and enforcement characteristics affect corruption (corruption-control). The legal origin classification is guided by La Porta et al. (2008, p. 289) .
Fourthly, the inclusion of income-levels to assess wealth-effects appears sound for a number of reasons.
(1) Economic prosperity can be associated with an increase in rent seeking activities.
(2) Recent African institutional literature has clearly established that wealth-effects are instrumental in institutional quality (Asongu, 2012d) especially corruption (Asongu, 2013d) .
Income-levels are based on the classification from the Financial Development and Structure
Database (FDSD) of the WB.
Fifthly, 'religious influence' has been documented as a significant instrument of government quality. It is based on the intuition that religious institutions play a significant role in the fight against corruption due to their orientation towards morally sound citizens. Apart from the particularity of religious institutions on ethical related issues, Christianity and Islam significantly differ in the perception of punishments related to corruption. From an African standpoint, the edge of Christian dominated countries over their Islam oriented counterparts in corruption-control is consistent with Asongu (2012d, p. 191) . Religious classification is in accordance with the Central Intelligence Agency's (2011) World Fact book.
Sixthly, there is an institutional cost of being landlocked (Arvis et al., 2007) especially in terms of corruption. Based on a preliminary assessment from our data, Landlocked countries have a slightly higher average Corruption Perception Index (CPI) (3.04) than their counterparts which are opened to the sea (2.96).
Seventhly, in order to add subtlety to the analysis we distinguish sub-Saharan Africa from North African countries. This distinction which is broadly in line with the World Bank's regional classification is relevant for regional policy implications. Moreover, such a classification has been essential to understand the dynamics of corruption-oriented literature on capital flight (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2008) .
Endogenous explaining, instrumental and control variables
The theoretical and empirical underpinnings for the endogenous explaining variables (channels) have already been substantially covered in Section 2.2.2. In light of the above ,we use aggregate investment dynamics (public and private) and fiscal behavior channels (government's final consumption expenditure and tax revenues), in accordance with the literature (Rostow, 1960; Chenery & Strout, 1966; Mosley et al., 1992; Boone, 1996; Addison et al., 2005; Reichel, 1995; Easterly, 2005; Morrissey, 2012 
Methodology
The paper adopts a Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation technique for two main reasons. While addressing the issue of endogeneity, the IV estimation underpinnings are consistent with the problem statement of the study. Our concern for endogeneity is valid on two main counts. Firstly, the CPI and corruption-control index are perception based measures that may be subject to public opinion bias owing to media propaganda for instance, hence issues of measurement error and omitted variables. Secondly, while investment and fiscal behavior affect corruption, the other way round cannot be ruled-out, hence the concern of reverse causality.
The estimation procedure entails the following steps.
First-stage regression:
(1)
Second-stage regression:
(2)
In Eq. (2) 
Empirical Analysis
Presentation of results
The section aims to examine two main issues: (1) the capacity of the exogenous components of fiscal behavior and investment mechanisms to explain corruption and;
(2) the ability of the instruments to explain corruption through the mechanisms. While the first issue is addressed by the significance and signs of estimated coefficients, the second concern is tackled with the Sargan-OIR test. The null hypothesis of this test is the position that, the aid instruments explain corruption only through the fiscal behavior and investment mechanisms. Hence, a rejection of this null hypothesis is a rejection of the view that the instruments do not explain corruption beyond the proposed channels. A Hausman test is performed prior to the 2SLS-IV estimation. The null hypothesis of this test is the position that estimated coefficients by OLS are efficient and consistent. Hence, a rejection of this null hypothesis points to the concern of endogeneity due to inconsistent estimates and thus, justifies to the choice of the IV estimation technique. Given the problem statement of the paper, the Hausman is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the 2SLS-IV approach. Hence, we still employ the IV procedure even in the absence of endogeneity. Table 2 is based on only the second issue. We are more interested in the second issue because it is premised on evidence of the first issue. In other words, the second issue can only be examined once the first has been confirmed. The synthesis in Table 2 is based on the following information criteria: (1) the estimated coefficient should be significant; (2) 
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The following general conclusions could be drawn from public officials turn to seek more rents in order to cope with rising prices and; economic prosperity in African countries has been found to deteriorate corruption-control irrespective of initial corruption-control levels (Asongu, 2013e, pp. 43-44) . 
Discussion of results, policy implications and caveats
Discussion of results
For over 50 years, the political economy of foreign aid has been substantially debated in academic and policy-making circles. A great chunk of the literature on institutions and development has concluded that Africa is poor because it lacks good institutions: lack of property rights, weak courts and contract-enforcements, dictatorships, political instability, hostile regulatory environment for private business and high corruption (Easterly, 2005; Kodila-Tedika, 2012 , 2013 . According to this strand, in order to end poverty in Africa, the West needs to promote good institutions in the continent. With the concern of how aid could promote good institutions in aid-recipient countries, a substantial bulk of the literature has focused on how institutions matter in the effectiveness of development assistance (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Alesina & Weder, 2002; Knack, 2001; Dixit, 2004; Djankov et al., 2005) . This paper has focused on the second strand of the challenges (highlighted in the introduction) by extending an ongoing debate on 'the effect of foreign aid on corruption' using investment and fiscal behavior transmission mechanisms. From the available weight of empirical evidence (summarized in Table 2 ), we have broadly established that, but for government's final consumption expenditure, tax efforts and investment channels (public and private) decrease (increase) corruption (corruption-control).
a) Corruption, (the composition of) government expenditure and aid
On the general negative nexus between government expenditure and corruption-control, we argue that government's final expenditure (both in collective and individual consumption terms) offers a breeding ground for more rent seeking and corrupt activities. The key idea here is that corrupt politicians and/or government officials would try to channel public funds to those expenditures that provide more lucrative opportunities for bribery. Consistent with Shleifer & Vishny (1993) , corrupt officials will choose to spend money on goods whose true value is difficult to be identified by agents. While problems due to information do arise again and this hypothesis has not been examined using static or dynamics frameworks, it is reasonable to assume that it is quite appealing. Hence, expenditure on military and high technology goods are some candidates for providing such lucrative opportunities. In fact, corruption and military spending have been found to be closely associated (Gupta et al., 2000) especially in military aircraft (Hines, 1995) . No surprising the worst post-apartheid corruption scandal (that has embroiled President Jacob Zuma) has been linked to the purchase of military equipment. In the same vein, in terms of high technology, the 'Albatross' jet affair that has rocked the Cameroonian institutional landscape has seen the arrest of many high profile politicians over the spectacular disappearance of $ 25 million destined for the purchase of a presidential plane.
Conversely, expenditures on education do not seem to provide any opportunities at all.
For instance, it would be difficult for a government official to collect bribes for appointing unqualified persons to teaching positions. This line of interpretation could be extended more or less to expenditures on health although one can argue that sophisticated hospital equipment could give rise to opportunities of bribery. Hence, it is natural that a recent budget scandal in South Africa has been the government's spending of R4 billion on entertainment, catering and travel allowance in 2011 whilst under-spending in health initiatives, leaving 47% of metropolitan South Africans dissatisfied. This confirms recent findings that corruption is associated with low spending on education and health in developing countries (Mauro, 1998; De la Croix & Delavallade, 2007) .
In light of the above, the instrumentality of foreign aid in the composition of government expenditure that induces corruption is obvious. Accordingly, the project approach to foreign aid has underestimated the incentive problems with aid delivery. Thus, health and education ministries must be motivated to get medicines and school inputs to the citizens. Moreover, donor bureaucracies themselves must have the incentive to make sophisticated infrastructural projects work. Firstly, looking at health, some of the initial progress in Africa has slowed possibly due to corruption (Easterly, 2005, p.8) . Studies in Guinea, Cameroon, Uganda and Tanzania estimated that 30 to 70% of government drugs disappeared before reaching the patients and complicated health problems cannot be solved with routine methods (Filmer et al., 2000; Prichett & Woolcock, 2004) . Secondly, as regards education, while enrollments have expanded rapidly, the quality of education has been hampered by missing inputs like textbooks and other school materials, weak incentives for teachers and corruption in education bureaucracies (Filmer & Pritchett, 1997) . Thirdly, on the bureaucracy of sophisticated projects, there have been some alarming dysfunctional signs. For instance, donors have spent over $2 billion over the last 20 years on roads in Tanzania, but the roads have not improved. In fact the principal output has been aid bureaucracy, with the Tanzanians producing 2,400 reports for the 1000 donor missions and government experts each year. To summarize the three points highlighted above with an example, Swaziland is good candidate that substantially relies on foreign aid, spends over 55% of its public spending on the wage bill, loses nearly double the annual social service budget to corruption, sells food aid and deposits the money in foreign bank accounts…etc.
b) Tax effort, corruption and aid
The positive nexus between tax effort and corruption-control is consistent with the bulk of studies that have argued that a more legitimate and responsive state (in terms of voice & accountability and corruption-control) is an essential factor for more adequate level of tax effort in developing countries (Bird, 2007) . Accordingly, the main reason for low tax effort in African countries may be that it is not in the interest of those who dominate the political institutions of such countries to increase taxes. Hence, if institutions are modified to produce more 'pro-fiscal' outcomes 11 , it is an indication of decreased (more) corruption (corruption-control) and growing voice & accountability. The underlying intuition motivating this argument is that for more taxes to be collected less tax funds should be siphoned by tax collecting officials or less tax officials should be bribed into not collecting the required amount of taxes. Another explanation of the relationship inherently lies in the definition of corruption. Accordingly, 'the effect of corruption'
which is typically defined as the abuse of public power for private benefit is captured by an index that measures that extent to which bribes are generally expected by government officials in relation to, inter alia, tax assessments, trade licenses and exchange controls. Thus it is logical to infer that the rise in tax revenues is significantly associated with a weakening in corrupt activities that stand on the way of tax efforts.
Fixing tax revenue targets as has been the case of some African countries in recent decades increases tax efforts, tax revenues and consequently decreases corruption related to the collection of taxes. A good example is Cameroon where the adoption of revenue targets at the Douala Seaport 12 has led to an unprecedented surge in revenue and at the same time unraveled corruption networks.
The instrumentality of foreign aid in the above highlighted nexuses could be explained by institutional requirements of donor agencies, especially in terms of voice & accountability. 11 Our results are consistent with Mkandawire (2011) 'on tax effort and colonial heritage' in the position that English common-law countries are likely to witness this scenario. 12 We chose the Douala Seaport as an example because; it serves both Cameroon and other neighboring landlocked countries like Chad and the Central African Republic.
Accordingly, when Western agencies require institutions to be more accountable to development assistance, this may lead to increased tax efforts for two main reasons. Firstly, authorities in place may want to show that they need grants because their tax revenues are not enough to finance government projects. The only proper way is doing this is proving that current tax efforts are genuine and not tainted by corruption practices. Secondly, depending on the composition of aid, concessional loans are associated with higher domestic revenue mobilization. This explanation is consistent with empirical evidence which suggest that for those countries with high levels of corruption, the decline in revenues completely offset the increases in grants (Gupta et al., 2003) . Moreover the positive association between aid and tax effort that ultimately increases corruption-control may be due to a higher composition of loans in the development assistance (Benedek et al., 2012) . It is only natural that more tax should be collected to service the loans.
c) Investment, corruption and aid
As far as we have reviewed, while there are many studies on the impact of corruption on investment (Baliamoune-Lutz & Ndikumana 2008), very few works have assessed this relationship the other way round. Larrain & Tavares (2004) which have investigated the incidence of foreign investment on corruption is the study that is closest to the current analysis:
foreign aid destined for investment purposes can also be indirectly considered as foreign direct investment (FDI) used by Larrain & Tavares (2004) . Our findings differ from those of Larrain & Tavares (who has established that FDI is significantly associated with lower levels of corruption) from three main standpoints: the use of a more updated database; the instrumentality of aid in the effect and conditionality of bureaucracies in the effect. Firstly, we have used a more updated dataset (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) in comparison to their study which used data for the period 1970-1994.
Secondly, in our results the nexus between investment and corruption is contingent on foreign aid. Thirdly, it should be noted that the positive effect of investment on corruption-control, conditional on aid does not amount to investment effectiveness. Accordingly, in the vein of the highlighted Tanzanian case on roads construction above, aid-led-investments may substantially increase accountability through more layers of bureaucracy. Hence, more funds allocated for the projects may be spent on consultancies which eventually lead to the ineffectiveness of the project while at the same time increasing corruption-control. Ultimately, if foreign aid is destined to less sophisticated public and private investments, whose true values are not difficult to be identified by agents, then corrupt officials are less likely to siphon.
d) How the findings reconcile the debate
The Okada & Samreth (2012) and Asongu (2012a Asongu ( , 2013a debate has centered along two main axes. While the former has presented a case for the negative incidence of aid on corruption in developing countries, the latter has rejected the findings within the context of Africa. Our results have reconciled the debate by using fiscal policy and investment channels of foreign aid to corruption. Accordingly, while the 'government's final consumption expenditure' channel is broadly consistent with Asongu (2012a Asongu ( , 2013a in the perilous (mitigating) effect of aid to (on) corruption (corruption-control), the investment and tax effort channels are broadly in accordance with Okada & Samreth (2012) . The former nexus is broadly in line with the first strand of the literature that has firmly established a negative aid-development nexus (Mosley et al., 1992; Reichel, 1995; Ghura, 1995; Boone, 1996; Pedersen, 1996) while the latter relationship is in accordance the bulk of studies that have concluded on the beneficial effects of aid (Ghura, 1995; Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Guillaumont & Chauvet, 2001; Collier & Dehn, 2001 , Collier & Dollar, 2001 Feeny, 2003; Gomanee et al., 2003; Clement et al., 2004; Ishfaq, 2004; Mosley et al., 2004; Addison et al., 2005; Fielding et al., 2006; Minou & Reddy, 2010; Resnick, 2012) .
Caveats and future research directions
Owing to the scope and positioning of the paper, in the analysis we have failed to incorporate two main distinctions that could have provided more focused policy implications.
Firstly, the distinction between concessional loans and grants in the measurement of development assistance will enable a better understanding of the instrumentality of aid in the nexuses. For example, the type of foreign aid that increases tax efforts. Secondly, it would have been interesting to decompose government expenditure into its constituent elements as to understand which components favor corrupt activities, since politicians and/or government officials would try to channel public funds to those expenditures that provide more lucrative opportunities for bribery. Therefore, the above caveats are interesting future research directions.
Conclusion
The Okada & Samreth (2012, EL) and Asongu (2012, EB; 2013 , EEL) debate on 'the effect of foreign aid on corruption' has had an important influence in policy and academic circles. This paper has provided a unifying framework by using investment and fiscal behavior transmission channels in 53 African countries for the period 1996-2010. Findings have reconciled the debate and broadly suggest that while the 'government's final consumption expenditure' channel is consistent with the latter author, the investment and tax effort channels are in line with the former authors. Justifications for the nexuses have been provided. Policy implications on how to use foreign aid constraints in managing fiscal behavior as means of reducing (increasing) corruption (corruption-control) have been discussed. 
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